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This paper introduces a matiieinat ical framework for evaluating,
tne reiationsnip between policies anu mecnanisms . An evaluation
approacn oailea the assignment tecnnique is definea. This tech-
nique consists of estaolisning an assignment oetween tne security
classes of information esta/olished oj policy constraints, and tne
protection domains, establisnea by tne properties of tne mechan-
ism. The assignment tecnniq.ue provides a theoretical foundation
for assessing tne sufficiency of an access control mechanism with
respect to a well formed protection policy. Aitnougn this paper
presents preliminary results of research, tne proposed framework
suggests a promising new approacn for evaluating tne protection
mecnanisms of existing and proposed systems.
INTRODUCTION
The suitability of a protection mechanism for any given secu-
rity policy is not always apparent. Tnis paper presents a
theoretical foundation for assessing the sufficiency of an access
control mechanism as a means of enforcing, a non-discretionary
security policy. a technique, termed assignment, establishes a
rexationsni^ between trie iniormation sensitivities of the system
entities \,partionea according to policy constraints), and domi-
nance domains (innerently established by a protection mechanism).
Tne assignment technique provides a method for mechanism valida-
tion, since the results of the assignment can be evaluated to
establish whether or not tne constraints of the policy are met.
The assignment technique was developed as a means of identi-
fying trie limitations of well-formed access control mechanisms.
The initial investigation examined tne feasibility of using the
i'iultics ring mechanism |_ 1 3 J as a means of enforcing a hierarchi-
cal compromise ^olicy. Our basic national Security policy [5 j is
a well Known example. It was established oy assignment (as is
shown in this paper) that the Multics ring mechanism, of itself,
cannot provide this security. On the other hand, it is snown
that tne Multics ring mechanism does enforce an important form of
pro &ram inte^rit,/ policy. This program inte ritj mechanism can
be used to delimit a most privileged set of programs known as the
security kernel |_ 1 1 J • The security kernel in turn provides a
mecnanism sufficient to enforce other security, integrity cr
access control policies. Thus, with the security kernel
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tecnnolo^' , tne rin^ me c nanism is sufficient :'or enforcing com-
puter securiij . By using assignment, we nave gaineu a mucn
oetter unuerstOinuing of tne capaoilities ana Limitations of a
rin^ protection lie onanism, and have introduced a tool for tne
assessment of other protection mechanisms.
Tix^ PhIliCIrL.cS OF ASSIuji-i-JT
In oraer to clearly present the assignment technique we begin
witn a discussion of the principles of access control. This is
necessary uecause mucn of the information published in this area
appears to be imprecise or even contradictory in nature. Some of
trie terminology used in this paper may also appear to contradict
other authors. These differences and distinctions are inten-
tional and will be discussed in greater detail in an anticipated
thesis [14J by Lt. Shirley. This paper merely addresses the
basic framework which we choose for our discussion.
lattice Security Policies
A security policy is based upon external laws, rules, regula-
tions and other mandates that estaolish what access to informa-
tion is to be permitted. We choose as our universe of discourse
tne lattice security policies as identified by waiters [15] and
later also described by Venning [3j- These universally bounded
lattice structures consist of finite, partially ordered sets of
access classes, eacn having a least upper and greatest lower
bound. This class of policies encompasses many (if not all)
practical policies. Such policies are of primary interest to
national Defense because all non-discretionary security policies
can ue represented as a lattice policy. To be effective, such
policies must clearly establish an access class for all system
entities, i.e., subjects vtne active entities) and objects (the
passive entities tnat may be referenced by a subject). Further-
more, the policy must identify all permissible access relations
oetween the subjects and objects of various equivalence classes.
If <* policy were not aule to meet tnese two requirements, the
enforcement of the policy could not be evaluateQ.
i.ote tnat we distinguish between processes and subjects in
this paper. This is necessary because of the ambiguity that
might result without the distinct notion of a subject as a
process-aomain pair [9» ^ <- J » particularly when we present a for-
malized definition of a domain.
access Relations
Any specific policy will distinguisn one or more distinct
access relations between subjects and objects. Tnese are typi-
cally mirrored in trie "access mode" of the corresponding protec-
tion mecnanism.
Two generic access modes are sufficient for a. general discus-
sion of trie principles and policies discussea in this paper.
Tnese are |_7j "observe" (the ability to observe information) and
"modify" (the ability to modify information). Other primitive
access modes are generally just a finer granularity of observa-
tion and modification priviledges.
The enforcement of a policy is fundamentally limited by the
system's granularity of access. Policies that prescribe distinc-
tions not recognizeu by the access control mecnanisms must be
enforced in an overly restrictive manner or ignored. For exam-
pie, a policy addressing a concatenation access relation cannot
uc precisely enforced on. a system that does not recognize some
form of append access mode.
The granularity of access control within a system is depen-
dent upon tne ability to distinguish attributes of subjects and
objects and upon the variety of access modes available. The
primitive access modes are associated with the design of the sys-
tem, including the protection mechanisms, and designate the asso-
ciated ri^nts obtained by an access request.
rtn access relation is a tuple ( subject, access mode,
object). This tuple signifies that a relation between the subject
and object exist such that tne subject is permitted to access the
object witn all the privileges associated with the access mode.
Tne problem of information security may generally be expressed as
the problem of permitting the existence of only those access
relations that in no way violate any of the applicable systems
policies
.
.oasic national security Policy Example
Tne basic national Security policy is a simple lattice pol-
icy. The policy defines entities as members of one of four
hierarchical access classes (UNCLASSIFIED, COili'lDEliTIAL, SECRET
,
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ii^ure KB) snows tine information flow cnaracteristics of
this lattice ^oiicy 1_ 3 j • This information transfer patn L ^ > J Gan
be analyzed with respect to permissiole access relations.
Based on this analysis of the permissible access relations
between (subjects and objects with) the various access classes,
we derive an alternative illustration form tnat is convenient for
our analysis. Figure 1(C) illustrates the basic national Secu-
rity policy using this form. Jote tnat a node represents an
equivalence class of entities all of whicn have the sane access
class. A directed arc represents the permissible access
relations from a suoject of the source equivalence class to
oojects of the destination equivalence class. Transitivity of
access relations is not sho-vn cut is assumed.
Recall tnat a system is "secure" if there are no access rela-
tions that violate any applicable policy. Tne Simple oecurity
Condition L 1 j states that if observe access is permitted, tnen
the access class of the suoject is greater tnan or equal to the
access class of tne object. Tne "Confinement Property" — his-
torically known oy the less descriptive name of * - Property [1 ]
— states that if modify access is permitted, then the access
class of tne subject is less than or equal to the access class of
the object. We can see that Figure 1(C) is derived directly from
these two properties.
Access ^omains
Co far, we have concentrated on the properties of policies.
We now examine the properties of the protection mechanisms used
to enforce security policies. The principle notion we use is
that of an access domain.
rtn access domain A, is a tuple, ( a^ , ap> •••, a,, ..., a
), where n is the number of primitive access modes in the system,
and a^ is tne set of all objects, \ C. , ? , •••, 0-, ..., j
which a process executing in domain A. may access by access mode
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"i". tie o r earv of an ^cceos mode)—domain :-a.s the set of objects
Which a process execaiinu in that domain has the right to access
according, to that particular access mode.
Consider trie following, two domains:
A
1
: ^ ^bserveu): lA,B,Cj, l;iodify(H) : { A,D ,E j )
A ^ : ( : I A , C , j , ? j , i'i : I (p j )
The observe-douiaia of Z\^ v. denotea as v/j^ ) is objects A
,
B, ana C. The modify-domain
.-.ZA2 i- s empty.
A set of dominance aomains are implicitly established oy the
system's protection mecnanisms. The dominance aomains are not
associatea with any particularization of processes ana objects,
but ratner dominate all the domains that may occur in the sys-
tem.
Dominance aomains may be uniquely labeled for convenience.
in tne riultics system, for example, the dominance domains esta-
blished 'q-j the rin^ mechanism were known as rin^s ana were
laDelea by ring numbers. Schroeaer's protection mechanism also
uses numbers as labels for dominance aomains [12 j.
We say tnat f\ ^ aominates ( o£ ) /\ ,^ iff for each a^, ai^2
C, a^LA-i • Tne systems protection mecnanism then, establishes a
set of dominance aomains which we can use for validation of pro-
tection mechanisms. Because these domains dominate all other
aomains tnat may occur in the system, if we can show that our
1 1
policy holds ior these domains, we nave snown tnat it holes for
tne system.
in this ^aper, we cnoose to consider only protection necnan-
isms whicn establish a universally bounded lattice of dominance
domains. ouch mechanisms represent an interesting subset of pro-
tection mechanisms and provide simplicity in tnis discussion.
Tne nssigncient Technique
nssi fcnment is tne establishment of a relationship between two
entities sucn that tne first entity is "assigned to" the second
entity. Mathematically, tne term assignment is not significant,
one could easily nave said that entity 1 is related to entity 2.
intuitively, nowever, assignment is associated with the connota-
tion "to fix authoritatively" wnich precisely signifies our
notion of this process.
Assignment may oe denoted by a grapn from the first entity to
the second as follows:
is assigned to"
Assignment does not alter eitner entity. Rather, a relation-
ship between tne entities is established which can be expressed
in the form of a tuple as follows:
Id
f. L/ U £iO U l/xiiiiju DOi'iXitAitCzi JUt'iAli*
" is ass i t^nea to
"
nt 6aralfcSo of tae means of representation, assi riment is merely
Ihe act of associating an entity or set of entities with some
otner entity or set of entities.
Trie essence of tne assignment technique is relatively simple.
First of all, consider tne nature of a lattice security policy,
oucn a policy partitions the objects of a system into a lattice
of equivalence classes, Each equivalence class can ue thougnt of
as an entity subject to assignment.
Tnen consider a mecnanism, wnicn establishes a lattice of
dominance domains. Each of these domains can also be thougnt of
as an entity subject to assignment.
Since an assignment can be estacli;,;.ed between any two enti-
ties, we can majie an assignment between the equivalence classes
estauiisned oy a lattice security policy and the dominance
domains that are estaoiished oy some protection mechanism. V.e
tnen validate tnat y,for tnis assignment) the mecnanism is suffi-
cient to support that policy. This determination is made by exa-
mining the set of access relations that tne mecnanism permits,
and testing for possible violations of the policy.
We are now ready to illustrate now we may use this assignment
tecnnique to evaluate protection mechanisms used in the design of
secure computer systems.
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Ihe usefulness of the assignment tecnnique appears tc be
rather far reaching in scope. Researcn currently underway is
investigating a number of possibilities . This paper addresses
only a few of the possible applications. The authors wholeheart-
edly invite tne reaaer to suggest areas of further researcn.
Additionally, comments, opinions, and researcn findings related
to tne assignment technique are solicited.
Multics Ring Mechanism Assignments
Tne question of the sufficiency of tne Multics Ring Mechanism
for enforcement of tne basic I.ational Security policy was the
initial problem that prompted the current researcn effort and led
to tne formulation of tne assignment tecnnique. It is appropri-
ate tnen, that this paper present this analysis as an introduc-
tory application of simple assignment.
Compromise Policy . ns stated previously in this paper, the
basic national Security policy is a simple lattice security pol-
icy. Figure 1(C) illustrates this policy.
Tne dominance aomains of tne Multics Ring nechanism are most
frequently shown as concentric rin&s numbered in increasing
integer order from the innermost ring or the kernel. The kernel
is 6enerally assigned ring number Q. For simplicity, we only
show a system with rings thru 3 in tnis analysis. Otner ring
numbers will produce similar results.
.<e De^in dv assigning, tne least upper bound cf our lattice t
















;«ow we must examine tne access relations permitted by the
Laechanisci and test for pessiole violations of the policy. In
oraer to do so, we must examine the nature of the i-iultics Aing
Mechanism more closely.
The i-iultics tling riechanism determines the authorized access
of a process 'oy means of the current ring number (r). Thus a
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process which is executing in ring number 1 would need to "be
cleared for at least SECRET information according to our assign-
ment scneme.
The nuitics Ring iiecnanism discriminates among objects by
means of a rin& bracket. The rin fe bracket is a 3 - tuple ( R1 ,
R2, R5) where n.1 , R<_ ana R3 are ring numbers ana n1 _<_ R2 <^ R3 •
ncceas to objects is restrictea such that the current rin^ of
execution must be less than or equal to R^ to ooserve information
ana less than or equal to R1 to aoaify information. Figure 3
snows cnaracteristics of the ring brackets both in terms of the








Consider then an object that is classified as SECRET. Such
an object must be assigned a ring bracket such that it may be
observed by processes in ring u and ring 1 only. R2 must there-
fore be 1. A problem now becomes apparent. A , o matter what value
we cnoose for R1 , we are faced witn a contradiction. If R1 is
or 1 then TuP SECRET processes may modify SECRET files violating
the Confinement Property. If R1 is greater thin 1, the restric-
tions of tne ring mechanism would be violated (viz., .t1 > R^ ) .
Tnerefore, we can conclude tnat tnis assignment is not accept-
able .
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Consider now trie only »tn«r potential assignment scheme wnere
tne greatest lower bound of our lattice id assigned to ring 0.

















uti now attempt to assign ring brackets to an object classi-
fied 3iCKE2. A problem occurs immediately. We want processes
executing in ring 2 to be able to observe our SECRET objects, but
then a process in ring o, that is UNCLASSIFIED, will also be able
to observe our ooject. Tne Simple Security Condition cannot be
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enforced with this assignment so the assignment scheme is not
f easi Die .
oince neitner of these assignments are acceptable, and shift-
ing the ring assi &nments numerically .vould j ield similar results,
we can see tnat no assignment will be acceptable. Therefore, the
Multics Ring Mechanism is not sufficient to enforce the basic
national Security policy for compromise.
The basic national Integrity policy [2J is the dual of the
basic National Security policy. Whereas the security policy is
concerned with the unauthorized observation of information or
compromise, the integrity policy is concerned with the unauthor-
ized modification of information or suoversion. The assignment
tecnnique snows us tnat the Multics Ring necnanism is not suffi-
cient to enforce tnis dual ^olicy either.
Ine Multics Ring Mechanism is not sufficient to enforce the
basic national Security policy nor the basic national Integrity
policy. iiowever, a Multics Security Kernel has been designed
U3j tnat is sufficient to support both of these policies. This
may seem to be a contradiction, but it is not. The confusion is
dissipated wnen one asKS the question, "What form of policy does
the Multics Ring necnanism support?"
Program Integrity Policy . The notion of a program integrity
policy stems from tne desire to prohibit modification of execut-
able programs oy less trustworthy subjects. In trie &eneral sense,
we wish to ensure that our more sensitive programs are
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"tamperproof . " Jnlike a strict integrity policy, however, pro-
gram inte^rit,/ id not concerned with tne issue of ^ensrai obser-
vation of information. Rather, program inte fority deals only with
execution anu modification. In this case, we refine tne access
mode "observe" to that of "read/ execute" access mode, taxen in
tne sense of tne general vernacular.
h program integrity policy must consider two issues. First,
eacn entity witnin tne system must have a program integrity
access class, designated PI, assigned to it. Jecona, the order-
in^ of program integrity access classes must be fixed according
to tne constraints of tne policy maker. wnce these issues are
resolvea, we may guarantee tnat no direct threat is possiole by
enforcement of the following condition:
oimple rro ram inteQ r ity Condition : If a subject has
"modify" access to an object, tnen the program integrity of
tne suoject is greater than or equal to the program
integrity of tne object.
Because program integrity policies are concerned with the
execution issue, indirect modification of information is not
strictly pronioited. Tnis provides a certain degree of flexibil-
ity but also produces a certain amount of risx [b]. Confinement
of execution helps to reduce the risk of such an indirect threat.
The indirect tnreat occurs when a subject executes a program that
has oeen modified by another less trustworthy subject. We can
further see tne usefulness of confinement in a program integrity
policy ~oj noting tnat this property supports the use of library
function. In a manner directly analogous to that for the
19
national integrity policy [kj, we define the confinement property
for program integrity as follows :
?ro &ram Integrity uonf inement Property : If a subject has
execute access to an ooject then the program integrity of
the ooject is greater tnan or equal to the program integrity
of the subject.
The cnaracteristics of an example program integrity policy in
terms of access modes is snown in Figure 5« Sucn a policy is








Consider now a specific program integrity policy. According
to this policy, entities are partitioned into one of four access
classes designated as user, Supervisor, Utility or Kernel. The
sensitivity of these access classes is specified as : Kernel >
Supervisor > utility > User. We then consider an assignment to a















r i gu r e o
necallin^ the characteristics of ring brackets shown in Fig-
ure 5» we designate "hax" as Ring 0, the program integrity access
ciass "n" as R1 ana "Min" as R2. .«e note thai; for this policy
any choice for R2 greater than or equal to R1 will do. A no re
sophisticated policy requiring the notion of a "gate" is beyond
the scope of tnis paper.
We now examine the access relations permitted by the mechan-
ism ana test for possiole violations of the policy. From this
examination, we can see that tne read-domains, the modify-domains
ana tne execute-domains for each rin^ (Ring J thru Ring 3) permit
aj.1 vaiia access relations to occur, and prohibit tne occurrence
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of any invalid access relation with respect to this policy. So
for this assignment, no violations are possiole. Therefore, we
nave shc.vn tnat the Multics Ring Mechanism is sufficient to sup-
port this Program integrity policy.
This issue of wnat form of protection the Multics Ring
Mechanism proviu.es, appears to be precisely tne issue that Wulf,
Jones and tne other designers of the "EYDRA" system were attempt-
ing to understand [16]. They introduce their discussion by first
saying :
"Protection is, in our view, a mechanism." [16J
Their uiscussion then proceeds to make the following general
statement relative to tne Unities rinas:
jection of hierarchical sy
especially ones which employ a single hierarchical relation
for all aspects of system interaction, is also, in part, a
consequence of the distinction between protection ana secu-
rity, n failure to distinguish these issues coupled with a
strict hierarchical structure ieaas inevitably to a succes-
sion of increasingly privileged system components, and ulti-
mately to a "most privileged" one, which gain their
privilege exclusively by virtue of their position in the
hierarcny. Such structures are inherently wrong ..." [16 J
*i.aa the assignment technique been available to the authors of
tne above statement, they would nave been afforded a means of
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expressing their views more precisely than the ambiguous phrase
" inherently wrong" . Tne assignment technique provides a precise
ueans for clearly formulating such an observation ana evaluating
its validity. As shown, ana in agreement with Wulf's statement,
tne iiultics fting i'iechanism is " inherently wrong " with respect to
compromise policies. On tne other nana, the Multics Ring uecnan-
ism is just " right " as a means of enforcing a program integrity
policy or assisting in tne enforcement of the system's non-
hierarcnical security policies (viz., via Security kernels).
Other King Mechanisms
Tne wultics Ring necnanism is oy no means the only form of
Ring i'iechanism. By altering tne requirements of the Ring Brack-
ets ana the need for a uate aeeper, one can contemplate adapting
the ring mechanisms to meet other simple hierarchical policies.
Consider using tne assignment shown in Figure 2, but altering
the means of discrimination among objects such that tne Ring
Bracket is a singleton (R1 ) . Following tne rules shown in Fig-
ure 7, we can adapt this rin fe mecnanism to enforce the basic
national Security policy.
i i o a i i y
reserve
Figure 7
Similarly, Figure 8 shows trie rules necessary for the same
assignment as shown in Figure 2 to adapt this ring mechanism to
meet the basic u'ational Integrity policy. Examining Figure 7 and





I'o be sure, these brief suggestions ao not completely charac-
terize a practical protection mecnanism. however, it appears
that rin& mechanisms are adaptable for the enforcement of various
simple hierarchical policies.
Capability i-iechanisms
Considerable effort is currently underway to provide Provably
Cecure Operating Systems based upon the capability mechanism
[_b,luj. It is important to examine what form of protection capa-
bilities actually provide.
Capability mechanisms primarily estaolish two dominance
domains which are enforced by the system hardware. ^ne domain
consists of capaoilities , and tne other is objects that are not
capabilities such as segments ana directories. A process takes
no note of tnese dominance domains, however, because all
processes nave access to capabilities as well as otner types of
objects. Co with respect to a process, the capability mechanism
provides no inherent partitioning of the system entities at all.
In fact, in tr^in fe to determine the structure of dominance
domains for non-capability objects, we encounter a veritable
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"s^a^hetti bowl" of domains, devoid of any innereni, unifying
structure. Xnus a capability mechanism is of itse-lf not suffi-
cient for tne enforcement of any non-discretionary policy.
This is not to say that a capability mechanism is not useful.
For example, tne mecnanism can protect a security kernel in much
tne same way as rin^s protect the Kernei in the Multics aesi cn.
2b
'J U ij C .Li U b -L O 1< O
Hssi fcnnient has been shown to be a usei'ul tecnnique in
evaluating the sufficiency of a mechanism to enforce a security
policy. This tecnnique is based upon a formalized notion of
domains and the lattice nature of security policies.
Tnis metnod provides considerable insight into the nature of
access control. Characterizing a subject as a process-domain
pair, we observe that non-discretionary protection is dependent
only upon the dominance domains estaolisned by the systems
mecnanisms and tne access relations between these domains. The
nature of tne computation is irrelevant. Furthermore, one can
ooserve that any protection policy can only be implemented on a
computer system which has some form of system isolation prohibit-
ing the users from altering tne system's isolation method.
This paper presents an introduction to assignment, and
several simple examples have been investigated. Considerable
researcn effort is still necessary. Of particular interest is
the use of the assignment tecnnique as a guide in the construc-
tion of new mechanisms to meet classes of policies of broad
interest. Assignment researcn has already provided consideracle
insight to tne nature of security enforcement, providing a means
of formally presenting tne characteristics of mechanisms and pol-
icies. Hecnanisms can be categorized by the type of enforcement
26
tnat tney proviue tnuo ^ivin^ the system's designer a tool for
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